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Marek Zmyslowski:
A Fraud History Across Three Continents

Marek Zmyslowski: a fraud history across three continents

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Why does the same scenario keep playing out around Marek Zmyslowski — in Nigeria, in Poland, and now in the Dominican Republic? This page collects the publicly documented pattern: investor capital flowing in, partners forced out, projects left unfinished, and a consistent narrative that paints Marek Zmyslowski as “the victim”. Read the full Samana Group investigation for the most recent chapter.

Chapter one: Nigeria, Hotels.ng and Jumia Travel

Marek Zmyslowski first built a public profile in Africa, where he was associated with Jumia Travel and Hotels.ng. The Nigerian chapter ended in a public dispute with local partners that was reported in the African business press. A 2019 article on Ventureburn (read here) describes investor allegations against him — the same vocabulary that would later resurface around Samana Group: missing funds, unanswered emails, conflict with co-founders.

Zmyslowski responded to those Nigerian allegations with a book and a media campaign in Poland. As we write in the main investigation, witnesses say they heard from the author himself that significant parts of that book are “literary fiction created for narrative purposes”. The book functioned less as a record of facts and more as a reputation reset before the next chapter began.

Chapter two: Poland, SunRoof and the Szczecin apartment

After Africa, Marek Zmyslowski returned to Poland and continued raising capital from Polish investors. He was a shareholder in SunRoof and used Polish crowdlending platforms — Emiteo, Crowder — to gather funds at promised yields of 12–16% per year. Polish investors were promised:

One of the central pieces of that “security” was an apartment in Szczecin, allegedly held to protect Polish lenders. According to a webinar recording referenced in our Facts vs. Lies section, Zmyslowski himself admitted on camera that the property was sold because banks would not accept the appraised value — only to later claim publicly that “the apartment was never collateral”. Two contradictory statements, one apartment, one lender pool now waiting for repayment.

By 2025, repayment delays had escalated. As described in the story of Mr. Przemek, lenders who had transferred PLN 50,000 or PLN 70,000 at 14% per year were receiving symbolic repayments of approximately PLN 1,000 every few weeks, after multiple reminders. The pattern is consistent: keep paying just enough to argue the company “is settling its liabilities”, while the principal remains stuck.

Chapter three: the Dominican Republic and Samana Group

The current chapter is the largest in scale. According to conservative estimates collected from investors, employees and partners, more than USD 13.5 million has flowed into Samana Group over the past two years. The flagship projects — Nomad City Condo, Hacienda Cocuyo and the new Samana Landbank Trust — were sold under the language of institutional-grade, Swiss-supervised, asset-backed investments.

What investors actually report:

The April 2026 update — covered in detail on the main page — escalates this further with a multi-jurisdictional legal narrative spanning the Dominican Republic, Poland, the United States and Argentina, and a headline figure of approximately USD 20 million in claimed damages, presented without underlying methodology.

The recurring pattern across all three chapters

Looked at side by side, Nigeria, Poland and the Dominican Republic are not three unrelated business misadventures. They are three iterations of the same operating template:

  1. Aggressive fundraising built on impressive yield numbers, “institutional” framing and high-profile media presence.
  2. Personal guarantees from Marek Zmyslowski that turn out to be economically empty — he himself admits to having no personal assets because “everything is in the project”.
  3. Conflict with co-founders at the moment those partners ask for transparency or governance — later reframed as a hostile attack by “minority shareholders”.
  4. A new corporate vehicle opened next to the troubled one (in the Dominican case: GRUPO SAMANA REH SAS), allowing operations to continue while old creditors are kept on a slow drip of partial repayments.
  5. Pressure on critics — defamation lawsuits, threats of legal action, paid moderation of online reviews. See the Mr. Zbigniew defamation case and the GoWork manipulation for live examples.

This page is not a verdict. It is a timeline. The point is that prospective investors, journalists and regulators do not have to take a single allegation on faith — they can compare three independent jurisdictions, three sets of investors, and ask why the same words keep appearing.

What investors and creditors can do today

If you have invested with Marek Zmyslowski or any Samana Group entity — whether through Crowder, Emiteo, a private loan, a Nomad City reservation, or the Samana Landbank Trust — you are not alone, and the practical steps are the same regardless of jurisdiction:


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